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Between the rule of law and oligarchic influence 
Denis Cenușa 
CEPS Paper in Liberty and Security in Europe No. 2019-02, May 2019 
Abstract 
The state capture and oligarchic control of political power and electoral processes in the associated 
countries of the Eastern Partnership – Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine – are acknowledged by EU 
institutions, civil society organisations and in public opinion. That inevitably puts pressure on the 
resilience of these three countries, in addition to Russia’s aggressive campaigns, carried out with or 
without the use of conventional weaponry. This policy brief looks at the EU’s actions to invest in and 
consolidate the rule of law, in the direction of stimulating internal resilience. It provides a range of 
arguments supporting the idea that the EU is not sufficiently tackling the oligarchic influences in 
Moldova, Ukraine and Georgia. These are followed by timely recommendations for the EU institutions 
to remedy the situation.  
 
1. Introduction 
High levels of ‘state capture’ and oligarchic control of political power and electoral processes 
in the associated countries of the Eastern Partnership (Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine) have 
frequently been acknowledged by EU institutions, civil society organisations and in public 
opinion. The downward spiral of these drawbacks has undermined the implementation of the 
reform-driven Association Agreements in terms of building a more functional rule of law. This 
state of affairs runs counter to the ambitions of the 2015 review of the European 
Neighbourhood Policy, the 2016 EU Global Strategy and the 2017 Strategic Approach to 
Resilience in External Action, which emphasised the need to strengthen the rule of law in third 
states. The EU aimed to create more resilience in the region, viewed in tight connection with 
the transformative capacity within the states, which via reforming can withstand and recover 
from internal and external crises.1 The reality on the ground illustrates that internally the three 
analysed countries are vulnerable because of the appetite of informal groups to infiltrate 
government in order to manipulate the reforms and benefit from their ineffectiveness. 
Consequently, such behaviour puts pressure on the resilience of Moldova, Ukraine and Georgia, 
in addition to Russia’s aggressive campaigns, carried out with or without the use of 
conventional weaponry.  
The entire range of the EU’s above-mentioned framework documents invites the European 
institutions to engage with the eastern neighbours to strengthen their resilience. A special 
                                                     
1 European Union, “A Global Strategy for the European Union’s Foreign and Security Policy”, 2016, p. 23. 
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focus of the EU’s external action is on fortifying the functionality of states in ensuring the rule 
of law together with other aspects – democracy, human and fundamental rights. By doing that, 
the EU pursues a larger, and to some extent idealistic goal, of building inclusive, secure and 
prosperous societies in its surrounding regions.2  
The EU envisages the Association Agendas, which form the operational side of the Association 
Agreements with Moldova, Ukraine and Georgia, as avenues to achieve more resilience.3 Even 
if these countries have been involved in the implementation of Association Agendas for the last 
few years, the oligarchic groups have interfered with or diminished the rule of law, inevitably 
affecting the countries’ resilience. In semi-consolidated democracies like Moldova, Georgia and 
Ukraine, the oligarchic regimes possess a destructive potential for the rule of law and pulverise 
resilience. The oligarchic factors either represent the cause of a backward rule of law or a 
serious obstacle impeding the reforms.4 Because the EU is interested in obtaining resilience 
through reforms, it should take into consideration more rigorously the oligarchic factor, which 
interferes with reforms and hinders the rule of law.5 Thus, this policy brief sets out the EU’s 
actions in consolidating the rule of law in the direction of stimulating internal resilience on the 
one hand, and one the other hand argues that the oligarchic influences are not sufficiently 
being tackled in Moldova, Ukraine and Georgia. 
Primarily, the policy brief raises attention to the fact that while the EU has financed various 
actions to improve the rule of law in these countries, the influence of the oligarchs has not 
lessened but rather adapted. First, the policy brief analyses the content of the Association 
Agendas with Moldova, Ukraine and Georgia, in order to identify what measures the EU agreed 
to apply on the rule of law in relation to ongoing reforms so that the ruling oligarchy is tackled 
by direct or indirect means. Second, the attention turns to the programmes implemented by 
the EU, with the financial support of the ENI, for areas covering the rule of law that 
consequently can erode the oligarchic governance in each of the three countries. Third, the 
outcomes of the EU’s actions that pertain to the rule of law are studied by examining the 
implementation reports. The timespan of the analysis extends from 2015 until 2018. In 2015, 
the review of the European Neighbourhood Policy incorporated resilience; in 2018 the latest 
implementation reports under the Association Agreements with Moldova, Ukraine and Georgia 
were issued. Lastly, the policy brief includes a set of recommendations that are meant to 
constrain oligarchic governance. 
  
                                                     
2 Idem, pp. 25-26. 
3 European Commission, “Strategic Approach to Resilience in the EU’s external Action”, 2017, p. 15. 
4 W. Konończuk, D. Cenușa and K. Kakachia, “Oligarchs in Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia as key obstacles to 
reforms”, 24 May 2017, http://www.3dcftas.eu/system/tdf/Oligarchs_14%20June_FINAL_0.pdf?file=1&type= 
node&id=358%20. 
5 Idem. 
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2. Defining the problem: More ‘rule of law’ is not equal to less oligarchic 
influence 
The relationship between the EU and Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine has grown to the strongest 
extent so far due to the Association Agreements and the degree of commitments assumed by 
the governments of the three associated countries. Reform agendas for each of the three 
countries have never been so packed, or closely followed by the European institutions, in 
particular after full enactment of the agreements and the serious and diverse political crises 
that could be witnessed there. In Moldova, the banking fraud unveiled in 2015 exposed the 
deficiencies of the anti-corruption mechanism. The backslide continued when the electoral 
legislation was changed in 2017 to favour the oligarchic groups and ended with the 2018 
invalidation of local elections in Chisinau. In the case of Ukraine, the targeting of civil society 
with anti-corruption policies became one of the major shortcomings that caught attention.6 
Though Georgia is frequently assessed as the least problematic country out of the three, the 
oligarchic influence showed that it is not giving up attempts to strengthen its grip on power by 
deciding to write off the debts of 600,000 voters amid presidential elections,7 swaying the 
elections against the opposition.8  
The European institutions underlined on various occasions the shortcomings of the rule of law 
in Moldova, Ukraine and Georgia. That represents an indirect confirmation that the EU’s efforts 
to fortify their resilience are insufficient, and that the biggest enemy of the rule of law are the 
vested interests. Moldova’s case perfectly exemplifies the declining rule of law, showing at the 
same time the failure of the EU to exercise conditionality, but also the ability of the local elites, 
with oligarchic links, to undermine the rule of law. Neither the two resolutions of the European 
Parliament adopted in 2018, nor the decision of the European Commission to suspend the 
macro-financial assistance and the budgetary support, provided enough energy to make a 
breakthrough.9 While Ukraine and Georgia, which have their own oligarchic systems in place, 
are not suspected of similar degradation of the rule of law, the Moldovan case underscores 
that the oligarchic governance can ignore the commitments at any point. Empirically, the 
attempts of oligarchic groups to diminish the mechanisms of the rule of law explain that the 
former view the latter as an obstacle to their political-economic interests. Concomitantly, the 
resilience of these states is improbable without a robust rule of law, which is shielded from 
oligarchs’ targeting. Therefore, the EU should strategize around the reform of rule of law 
                                                     
6 European Commission, “Second Report under the Visa Suspension Mechanism”, 19 December 2018. 
7  “Debts of 600,000 Georgian citizens to be cleared just before second round of presidential elections”, 
https://jam-news.net/debts-of-600000-georgian-citizens-to-be-cleared-just-before-second-round-of-
presidential-elections/. 
8 OC-Media, “Ivanishvili returns to frontline Georgian politics”, 26 April 2018, http://oc-media.org/ivanishvili-
returns-to-frontline-georgian-politics/. 
9 D. Cenușa, “Year of disruptions in Moldova’s European integration: Top 3 accomplishments and failures in 2018”, 
26 December 2018, http://ipn.md/en/special/95557. 
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mechanisms in Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine in order to reduce the oligarchization 
phenomenon and thus increase the level of resilience.  
3. Association Agendas: Boosting the rule of law without constraining the 
oligarchic governance? 
Association Agendas represent important ‘road maps’ that help to arrange the actions, which 
derive from the provisions of the Association Agreements, for a two-year period. These 
operational documents are negotiated between the EU and the associated country, and 
therefore require a political and diplomatic consensus. Evidently, the national parties will reject 
the agendas if they include a straightforward mention of any measure directed against 
oligarchic interests. Also, the EU takes a careful approach to sensitive aspects, such as admitting 
blatantly that the oligarchs run a country under an EU Association Agreement. So, this policy 
brief depicts those elements of the agendas that correlate with the rule of law, but which hint 
at the oligarchic presence as well. 
Moldova. The EU–Moldova dialogue produced two Association Agendas, for 2014–16 and 
2017–19 respectively. The first document was adopted after the Association Agreement was 
signed, and the second one after the agreement entered into force in July 2016. This also 
coincided with improvement of the structure of the agendas, with short- and medium-term 
goals introduced by the European side for Moldova and the other two countries. Moreover, 
the two agendas practically separate the period before and after the state capture by oligarchic 
groups reached its maximum level, when the Democratic Party fully monopolised political 
power at the end of 2015.10  
The first Association Agenda for 2014–16 specifies clearly an area of action involving the rule 
of law. Out of five measures one had a limitative meaning with regard to the oligarchic factor, 
and it referred to upgrading the framework for financing political parties. The increased 
transparency of the financing that goes to political parties can impede or at least discourage 
the actions of infiltration in political equations by the vested interests. The measures proposed 
(ten actions) under the imperative of justice and judiciary reform have a cumulative role as 
well, in diminishing the ability of the financially powerful centres to exercise unlimited 
influence. The second agenda includes twenty-three short-term actions from which three can 
create barriers against oligarchic interference. They refer to financing parties and electoral 
campaign financing, which are also cited in the block of twenty-two medium-term actions. 
Ukraine. There is only one Association Agenda (of 2015) based on which the EU and Ukraine 
agreed to transpose the provisions of the Association Agreement and also to conduct reforms. 
The area concerning the rule of law includes five actions, out of which two can be qualified as 
actions that increase resilience against the oligarchy, but only with an indirect touch – justice 
                                                     
10  D. Cenușa, “How did Moldova become a ‘captured state’?”, 2 May 2017, http://www.ipn.md/en/ 
special/83596. 
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reform and the financing of political parties. Frequently, the ascension of oligarchs to power 
takes place through ‘colonising’ the political party system.11 Therefore, the introduction of 
transparency and reporting mechanisms for financial flows into the political parties, as 
suggested by the agenda, is essential to exclude the financial operations of the oligarchic circles 
with or without ‘offshore’ participation. 
Georgia. The first agenda adopted for Georgia was composed of six actions under the area of 
the rule of law. Only one measure can have effects on both improving the rule of law and 
limiting the impact of oligarchic interference – reinforcing the independence of the judiciary. 
In the second agenda, the rule of law part includes three actions, and one of them repeatedly 
concerns the judiciary. 
Overall, the agendas for Moldova are more extensive in terms of the rule of law. That creates 
the expectation that the oligarchy is much more exposed to constraints. However, the 
invalidation of elections in Chisinau in the courts and the subsequent freezing of financial 
support by the EU testify that the expectations do not match the results.12 The Association 
Agendas of Ukraine and Georgia draw less attention to the issue of the rule of law. The 
Ukrainian document shows that the EU’s attention is absorbed with a few priorities at once – 
on anti-corruption measures, administrative reform, the energy market, etc. Therefore, the 
existentialist reforms related to public order issues and against the perils resulting from Russia’s 
actions may seem to compete with the transformation sustained in the field of the rule of law. 
The content of the agenda for Georgia reflects a rather positive perception of the EU about 
how the rule of law functions in this country. Nonetheless, the recent presidential elections in 
Georgia gave rise to a unique case of ‘electoral bribery’ (the nullification of the banking debts 
of 600,000 individuals). 13 This scheme involved the financial institutions controlled by the 
leader of the ruling party, Georgian Dream, the influential oligarch Bidzina Ivanishvili, who has 
set the domestic political agenda since 2012. Civil society has also warned that the justice 
system is under pressure because of the clan-based functioning of the judiciary,14 although it 
has not connected the issue with the oligarchic presence.  
  
                                                     
11 W. Konończuk, D. Cenușa and K. Kakachia, “Oligarchs in Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia as key obstacles to 
reforms”, 24 May 2017, http://www.3dcftas.eu/system/tdf/Oligarchs_14%20June_FINAL_0.pdf?file=1&type= 
node&id=358%20. 
12  D. Cenușa, “Decay of EU-Moldova relations until a new electoral test”, 18 September 2018, 
http://ipn.md/en/integrare-europeana/93594. 
13  “Unprecedented move by Cartu Group to nullify debts for 600 000 Georgian citizens”, 
https://www.georgianjournal.ge/politics/35282-unprecedented-move-by-cartu-group-to-nullify-debts-for-600-
000-georgian-citizens.html. 
14  Transparency International Georgia, “Manifesto – For Saving Justice”, 25 February 2019, 
https://www.transparency.ge/en/post/manifesto-saving-justice. 
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Table 1. Rule of law aspects of the Association Agendas for Moldova, Ukraine and Georgia 
 Rule of law actions and relevance for reducing the presence of the 
oligarchy in the decision-making process 
Moldova 2014–16 1 out of 5 actions 
2017–19 3 out of 23 short-term actions 
Ukraine 2015 2 out of 5 actions 
Georgia 2014–16 1 out of 6 actions  
2017–20 1 out of 3 actions 
Source: Official documents of the EU, and the assessment of the author. 
4. The EU’s measures: A reactive approach instead of a preventive one 
The key financial support for reforms in Moldova, Ukraine and Georgia derives from the 
European Neighbourhood Instrument (ENI), scheduled for 2014–20 and designed to aid the 
reform process. Ensuring the rule of law and sustainable democracy are the ENI’s official 
targets.15 These financial resources are allocated through the annual action programmes for 
the neighbouring countries. The profile of the projects financed via the ENI for Moldova, 
Ukraine and Georgia during 2015–18 reveals whether the EU sets priorities that are linked to 
the rule of law. This policy brief claims that such priorities can contribute to diminishing the 
oligarchic influence in the three countries.  
An examination of the programmes financed by the EU through the ENI shows that the actions 
on the rule of law included in the Association Agendas are not covered. Understandably, the 
European institutions first rely on the self-determined commitments of the national 
governments in Moldova, Ukraine and Georgia. However, the reasoning of these same 
financing programmes exemplifies that the EU is ready to initiate programmes that deal with 
the rule of law, but only when a crisis breaks out. Moldova represents a descriptive case of such 
situations. In the aftermath of the banking fraud16 and other crimes in the financial sector, 
facilitated by high-level corruption, the EU decided to initiate a programme aimed at 
strengthening the rule of law and the anti-corruption mechanisms. The above-mentioned 
shortcomings were already known in 2015, but it took two years to propose measures that 
could address them (see Table 2). In 2018, the programme was announced, accounting for 
about €8 million, which has the goal to reduce public tolerance of corruption and boost the 
mechanisms meant to fight it.17  
                                                     
15 ENI, https://www.euneighbours.eu/en/policy/european-neighbourhood-instrument-eni#new. 
16 M. Emerson, D. Cenușa, T. Kovziridze and V. Movchan, The Struggle for Good Governance in Ukraine, Georgia 
and Moldova, Brussels and London: CEPS and Roman & Littlefield, 2018, 
http://3dcftas.eu/system/tdf/Struggle_For_Good_Governance.pdf?file=1&type=node&id=472&force=. 
17https://ec.europa.eu/neighbourhood-enlargement/sites/near/files/annex_3_clean_anti_corruption_final.pdf. 
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A different approach evolved for Ukraine, where the EU began to work on the rule of law two 
years after the ‘Euromaidan’ events of 2014. Under the ENI, a special measure was adopted in 
2016 to support the rule of law, a programme also called ‘PRAVO’, worth €52.5 million.18 It 
envisaged the reformation of the judiciary with regard to the rule of law, in addition to police 
reform. Another project of 2016, also motivated by post-Euromaidan political changes, links 
with anti-corruption policies. It combines investment in the capacity of anti-corruption bodies 
with larger oversight means for the legislative branch, and fosters engagement with and of civil 
society organisations (€16.34 million).19 By contrast, between 2016 and 2018, the Ukrainian 
authorities regularly delayed the fully-fledged operationalisation of anti-corruption institutions. 
During 2018, civil society reportedly faced around 50 attacks from elements of the old system 
resisting the anti-corruption actions.20 Many times these attacks go unreported and ignored by 
the central authorities,21 which amplifies the mistrust towards the office of the president, still 
controlled by the oligarch Petro Poroshenko. 
No specific programme concerning Georgia was designed between 2015 and 2018, which 
proves again that the EU evaluates in a satisfactory manner the situation of the third associated 
country. 
As Table 2 shows, the EU is reactive rather than preventive in its approach to support the 
reforms focused on the rule of law. Thus, Moldova and Ukraine benefited from the EU’s 
programmes, though in reactive thinking instead of preemptive. Nevertheless, even after that, 
the situation is changing very slowly and in some respects only slightly, as shown by the assaults 
on anti-corruption NGOs in Ukraine.22 At the same time, the initiative of Moldova was very 
much discredited by the invalidation of elections in Chisinau, which exemplified a systemic 
deficiency of the country’s rule of law. For instance, the ruling party, linked to an oligarchic 
entourage, attempted to transfer responsibility for the failure of the justice reform, which led 
not only to suspension of EU support and the previous pro-EU ruling coalitions,23 but also the 
European experts.24  
  
                                                     
18 https://ec.europa.eu/neighbourhood-enlargement/sites/near/files/eni_2016_039835_action_document_roldocx.pdf. 
19 https://ec.europa.eu/neighbourhood-enlargement/sites/near/files/c_2016_4719_039657_anti-corruption_initiative.pdf. 
20  A. Wishart, “Ukrainian civil society under attack”, 8 November 2018, http://neweasterneurope.eu/2018/ 
11/08/ukrainian-civil-society-attack/. 
21 Idem.  
22 “Second Report under the Visa Suspension Mechanism”, 19 December 2018, op. cit. 
23  Statement of the Ministry of Justice, 12 October 2017, http://www.justice.gov.md/libview.php?l=ro&idc 
=4&id=3629. 
24 https://adevarul.ro/moldova/politica/dionis-cenusa-guvernarea-contrapune-intentionat-reformele-cerute-fmi-
cele-atribuite-ue-1_5b42fa1edf52022f75023f6a/index.html. 
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Table 2. ENI Annual Action Programmes for Moldova, Ukraine and Georgia, 2015–18 
(€ millions) 
 Moldova25 Ukraine26 Georgia27 
2015 Overall amount €90 €90 + €70 €100 
Rule of law projects No project No project No project 
2016 Overall amount €89 €52.5 + €104 + €43.5 €109.5 
Rule of law projects No project 2 projects – Support for 
Rule of Law Reforms in 
Ukraine (€52.5);  
Anti-Corruption Initiative 
in Ukraine (€16.34) 
No project 
2017 Overall amount €10 - €96.5 
Rule of law projects No project - No project 
2018 Overall amount €50.75 - €79.14 
Rule of law projects 1 project – 
Strengthen the rule 
of law and anti-
corruption 
mechanisms in the 
Republic of 
Moldova  
(€8 million)28 
- No project 
Source: Author’s compilation from the European Commission’s webpage. 
The remaining associated country, where in spite of a vote-buying scandal no serious political 
crisis has occurred yet, and where the EU is reluctant to invest efforts in preserving the rule of 
law and prevent the negative impacts of oligarchic interference, is Georgia. The EU seems to 
ignore the fact that the dysfunctions in the rule of law in countries with which it has Association 
Agreements and Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Agreements keep the door open to 
                                                     
25“Financial allocation to Moldova via ENI”, https://ec.europa.eu/neighbourhood-enlargement/neighbourhood/ 
countries/moldova_en. 
26  Financial allocation to Ukraine via ENI, https://ec.europa.eu/neighbourhood-enlargement/neighbourhood/ 
countries/ukraine_en. 
27  Financial allocation to Georgia via ENI, https://ec.europa.eu/neighbourhood-enlargement/neighbourhood/ 
countries/georgia_en. 
28 Annex 3 of the Commission Implementing Decision on the Annual Action Programme 2018 in favour of Republic 
of Moldova, https://ec.europa.eu/neighbourhood-enlargement/sites/near/files/annex_3_clean_anti_ 
corruption_final.pdf. 
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oligarchic interference.29 Moldova’s dominant oligarch, Vladimir Plahotniuc,30 and the one in 
Georgia, Bidzina Ivanishvili, keep absorbing political power, while in Ukraine there are attempts 
to readjust to the ongoing reforming realities – by Petro Poroshenko and other oligarchs. 
5. Looking at the results: Rule of law aspects vary from one country to another 
The outcomes of the EU’s measures on the rule of law can be learned mainly from the 
implementation reports, which attempt to give an objective assessment. The European Court 
of Auditors assessed the quality of budgetary support for justice sector reform only for Moldova 
(2009–14)31 and, collectively for Moldova, Ukraine and Belarus (for the years 2000–05).32 The 
Court’s assessment of the ongoing rule of law-related programmes financed via the ENI in 
Moldova and Ukraine could help to mitigate the existing deficiencies, given the troubles faced 
by these countries, in particular the suspension of assistance for Moldova.33 The two reports 
assess the EU’s assistance offered before the implementation of the Association Agreements 
and respectively the Association Agendas (September 2014 for Moldova and Georgia, and 
November 2014 for Ukraine). Still, the 2016 report on Moldova is partially relevant because it 
refers to the $1 billion fraud in the Moldovan banking system, and criticises the slowness and 
inefficiency of the EU’s conditionality.34 
Strictly connected to the implementation of the Association Agreement, the implementation 
reports describe the results of measures included in the Association Agendas set up bilaterally 
by the EU with the authorities of Moldova, Ukraine or Georgia. These documents, published 
yearly, lack any analysis of the effects from the EU’s actions on the rule of law in the associated 
countries, carried out via programmes financed by the ENI. This shows a disconnection 
between the agendas, the programmes carried out under the ENI and the implementation 
reports. On the one hand, the programmes realised by the EU are in line with the goals of the 
agendas. On the other hand, the implementation report measures the degree of 
accomplishment of the agendas and leaves aside ENI-related programmes and actions. 
                                                     
29 S. Blockmans, N. Hriptievschi, V. Panasiuk and E. Zguladze, “Integrity on Trial: Judicial reform in Georgia, Ukraine 
and Moldova”, CEPS, Brussels, 2018, https://www.ceps.eu/publications/integrity-trial-judicial-reform-georgia-
ukraine-and-moldova. 
30  “Report on Implementation of the EU Association Agreement with Moldova”, 15 October 2018, 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?type=REPORT&reference=A8-2018-
0322&format=XML&language=EN. 
31 European Court of Auditors, “EU assistance for strengthening the public administration in Moldova”, 2016, 
https://www.eca.europa.eu/lists/ecadocuments/sr16_13/sr_moldova_en.pdf. 
32 European Court of Auditors, “The Effectiveness of EU Support in the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice for 
Belarus, Moldova and Ukraine”, 2008, https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX 
:52008SA0009&rid=2. 
33 D. Cenușa, “Scanning of EU macro-financial assistance to Moldova, Ukraine and Georgia: frontrunners and 
laggards”, 24 September 2018, http://ipn.md/en/integrare-europeana/93705. 
34 “EU assistance for strengthening the public administration in Moldova”, 2016, op. cit., pp. 19 and 29-34. 
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Moldova’s progress is reflected in two implementation reports. In the first report,35 under the 
chapter on good governance, the aspects of financing political parties and political interference 
in justice are included. In a separate chapter on justice, freedom and security, the EU exposes 
the major shortcomings of the judiciary, prosecuting and anti-corruption bodies, including the 
legislation constraining money laundering. The second report36 follows the same structure. 
Examination of both implementation reports indicates that they mismatch the structure of the 
Association Agendas, which explicitly point out the goal of strengthening the rule of law. 
Moreover, they overlook the programmes financed under the ENI.37 
A similar structure as that for Moldova is applied in the two implementation reports on Ukraine. 
Both of the reports have the same incongruity between the Association Agendas and the parts 
of the reports related to goals on the rule of law. The first report38 puts the focus on financing 
political parties in the part related to good governance, and then comes with detailed 
information about reforming the anti-corruption and justice institutions in the chapter on 
justice, freedom and security. The EU keeps an eye on the adoption of anti-money laundering 
legislation in Ukraine, similar to Moldova. This piece of legislation can be combative against the 
vested interests. The role of civil society in anti-corruption activities is observed in both 
reports, 39 but only starting with the second one are concerns about the attacks on NGOs 
emphasised.  
The least coverage of rule of law aspects is found in the implementation reports on Georgia. In 
the first report of 2016, the rule of law aspects are vaguely mentioned under the chapters on 
governance and on justice, freedom and security.40 The second report41 does not refer to the 
rule of law under the chapter regarding good governance, but introduces substance in the 
chapter on justice, freedom and security by presenting the issues related to justice and judiciary 
reform. Legislation on fighting money laundering is also mentioned. These reports do not yet 
cover the government’s attacks 42  against those NGOs 43  that monitor and criticise the 
                                                     
35 Association Implementation Report on the Republic of Moldova 2017. 
36 Association Implementation Report on Moldova 2018. 
37 It is referred to in the programmes mentioned in Table 2. 
38 Association Implementation Report on Ukraine 2017. 
39 Association Implementation Report on Ukraine 2018. 
40 Association Implementation Report on Georgia 2016. 
41 Association Implementation Report on Georgia 2017. 
42  “Government’s coordinated attack on civil society harms democracy in Georgia”, 24 October 2018, 
https://www.transparency.ge/en/post/governments-coordinated-attack-civil-society-harms-democracy-georgia. 
43 D. Cenușa, “Difficult coexistence between civil society and oligarchic regimes in Moldova and Georgia”, 5 
November 2018, http://www.ipn.md/en/integrare-europeana/94551. 
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clientelistic networks established by the oligarchic regime within the state institutions, which 
display “increasing signs of state capture”.44  
In all three cases, the rule of law goals as with many other aspects included in the Association 
Agendas are not reflected or properly evaluated in the implementation reports. Improvement 
of the monitoring and evaluation mechanisms can bring more clarity about both the EU’s 
efforts to promote the rule of law and their effectiveness.  
6. Conclusions and recommendations 
The EU takes into account the significance of reinforcing the rule of law in Moldova, Ukraine 
and Georgia, which is promoted via the Association Agreements in place with all three 
countries. The Association Agendas reflect a range of measures thought to strengthen the rule 
of law. Nevertheless, this policy brief underscores that the serious interference by oligarchic 
influences in Moldova and Ukraine undermines the efforts to fortify the supremacy of law. 
Though in the last five years Georgia has avoided crises identical to the ones that have 
happened in Moldova (the 2014 banking fraud and the 2018 invalidation of elections) or in 
Ukraine (the 2013–14 Euromaidan anti-governmental protests), the presence of oligarchic 
elements endangers the rule of law there too, and the ‘electoral bribery’ in Georgia’s 2018 
presidential elections confirmed it.  
There are three major conclusions of this policy brief. First, the content of the Association 
Agendas contain actions that serve to improve the rule of law. But only some of these actions 
can reduce the push from oligarchic interests. This results from reluctance to confront the 
oligarchic issue in a straightforward way. At the same time, the situation is degrading at 
different speeds in each of the three countries, where oligarchs go through a metamorphosis 
according to the particularity of the reforms. In this regard a serious change would be the open 
recognition by the EU of the consequences that the narrow business interests have on the 
functioning of the state. 
Second, the policy brief concludes that though the implementation reports attempt to describe 
the degree of accomplishment of the Association Agendas, they do not strictly follow the 
agendas’ structure. In a particular way, this triggers a disconnection between the rule of law 
objectives set in the agendas and the assessments provided by the implementation reports, 
which otherwise could be a useful tool to measure how effective the EU’s efforts are in the rule 
of law area. Moreover, the reports do not include information about the outcomes of rule of 
law programmes undertaken under the umbrella of the ENI.  
                                                     
44 Transparency International, “Alarm over Increasing Signs of State Capture and Pressure on Civil Society in 
Georgia”, 16 October 2018, https://www.transparency.ge/en/post/alarm-over-increasing-signs-state-capture-
and-pressure-civil-society-georgia. 
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Last but not least, the projects financed by the ENI are not proactive and have mostly been 
launched after the crises have occurred. In addition, the actions launched by now omit to 
directly target the issue of oligarchic interference.  
Until the oligarchic influences are constrained, resilient rule of law in Moldova, Ukraine and 
Georgia is at risk. An urgent change of this approach requires the EU to adjust the reforms 
under the Association Agendas, proportionate to the financial resources from the ENI, and to 
ensure a comprehensive monitoring tool.  
Recommendations 
Association Agendas 
• The documents should include more specific measures under the goals for the rule of 
law that target oligarchic interests, besides the financing of political parties and 
independence of the justice system. 
• Apart from the Association Agendas, the EU should develop ‘de-oligarchization road 
maps’, supported by a conditionality mechanism aimed at reducing the influence of 
oligarchic groups on politics, justice and the economy.  
Programmes under ENI 
• The current financial frameworks as well as future ones should foresee finance for 
eventually developing de-oligarchization road maps. Such investments will be more 
sustainable and complementary to the existing projects separately addressing the 
justice, judiciary or anti-corruption reforms. 
• The programmes financed under the ENI should adopt a permanent proactive and 
preemptive approach rather than a post-crisis management one on the rule of law. 
Reporting mechanisms 
• The implementation reports should become more comprehensive and include all 
actions in the Association Agendas under the goals for the rule of law, as well as all 
projects currently implemented and targeting the rule of law. 
• Additionally, the implementing reports need to cover the causes of the shortfalls in the 
rule of law with the same approach and objectivity for all three countries – Moldova, 
Ukraine and Georgia – which have serious problems with oligarchic groups interfering 
with or being part of the decision-making process. 
Other aspects 
• The European Court of Auditors should be involved in more frequent monitoring of the 
rule of law-oriented programmes financed by the EU in Moldova, Ukraine and Georgia. 
Furthermore, in future evaluations the Court could include the three associated 
countries in the same assessment report, offering a comparative perspective about the 
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effectiveness of the EU’s actions dedicated to the rule of law and the policies targeting 
(in)directly the vested interests. 
• The resilience policies applied by the EU, such as the Global Strategy or the Strategic 
Approach to Resilience, need reviewing in order to address the issue of oligarchic 
influence on the rule of law, which inevitably weakens the rule of law.  
• Dedicated resources are needed to explore the nature, levers of intervention and top-
down clientelistic network within which the oligarchic groups operate in Moldova, 
Ukraine and Georgia, in order to constrain the oligarchization and other derived 
phenomena, such as state capture. In this regard, an important focus should be on how 
deeply the oligarchic groups are connected with domestic and cross-border criminality. 
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